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WORKFARE AND INVOLUNTARY 
SERVITUDE-WHAT YOU WANTED TO 
KNOW BUT WERE AFRAID TO ASK 
CYNTHIA A. BAILEY* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
President Clinton promised to "end welfare as we know it" when 
he was elected into office in 1992.1 Since the Republicans gained 
control over Congress last November,2 Clinton's promise has taken on 
a new urgency. Indeed, it appears that Congressional Republicans and 
the Clinton Administration are trying to out-maneuver each other as 
to who can devise and take credit for the most dramatic welfare re-
forms. While the Administration touts its plan,3 Republicans are calling 
for the near-elimination of welfare altogether.4 There is one aspect of 
* J.D., Boston College Law School; B.S., Boston College. Ms. Bailey is currently clerking for 
Justice John A. Dooley of the Vermont Supreme Court. 
1 In Their Own Words: Transcript of speech Uy Clinton Accepting Derrwcratic Nomination, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 17, 1992, at A14. Clinton repeated this assertion in his State of the Union Address 
on January 24, 1995 when he stated: "Let this be the year we end welfare as we know it." State of 
the Union, The President's Address: ''We Heard America Shouting, "N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 25, 1995, at A17; 
see also Jason DeParle, Better Worn Than Welfare, But What If There's Neither?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
Dec. 18, 1994, at 42, 48 [hereinafter DeParle, Better Work Than Welfare]; Barbara Vobejda, Welfare 
Reform: Debate is Shifting to Rndical Changes, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 1994, at AI. 
2 The Republicans won majority control of both the Senate and the House of Representatives 
in the November, 1994 election. E.g., Adam Clymer, The 1994 Elections: Overview, G. D.P. Celebrates 
Its Sweep to Power; Clinton Vows to Find Common Ground, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 10, 1994, atAl; Robert 
Shogan & David Lauter, Republicans Score a Sweeping Victory; Elections: The Party Wins Majorities 
in the Senate and House; Voters Shun Clinton's Activist Government Message, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 
1994, at AI. 
3 The Clinton Administration first introduced its welfare reform plan on June 21, 1994 as 
the Work and Responsibility Act of 1994. H.R. 4605, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); S. 224, 103rd 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafter Work and Responsibility Act or Clinton Plan] (all references 
will be to the House of Representatives version of the Bill). To date, the Clinton Plan has not 
been reintroduced in the 104th Congress. However, on February 16, 1995, leading Democrats in 
the House of Representatives introduced a welfare reform plan whose main component is 
workfare. H.R. 982, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 102, 301-304 (1994) (Individual Responsibility Act 
of 1995). 
4 To date, the welfare reform bill that has garnished the most Republican support is the 
Personal Responsibility Act of 1995. H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) [hereinafter Personal 
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welfare reform, however, upon which both groups agree; both liberals 
and conservatives have fully embraced the idea of workfare.5 
Workfare specifically refers to the idea that welfare recipients 
should be required to work for their benefits.6 One of the main fea-
tures of the Clinton Administration's Plan, for example, is a cut-off of 
benefits after two years unless welfare recipients accept government-
providedjobs.7 Workfare is viewed by its proponents as a revolutionary 
new way to improve the welfare system.8 They believe that it will instill 
a strong work ethic among the poor, get them used to the idea of 
earning a paycheck, provide them with a sense of self-discipline, and 
enhance their self-esteem.9 Still others argue that workfare proposals 
are merely a new form of an old and tired idea.lO They contend that 
workfare rests on the erroneous assumption that poverty stems from 
Responsibility Act or Republican Plan). The Republican Plan proposes general caps on the 
growth of welfare spending and the ineligibility of aliens for public welfare. See id. tit. III (Capping 
the Aggregate Growth of Welfare Spending); tit. lV, § 401 (Ineligibility of aliens for public 
assistance). Specifically, the Personal Responsibility Act proposes reducing or denying Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits for children whose paternity is not estab-
lished, a denial of AFDC for certain children born out of wedlock, and a denial of AFDC for 
additional children. See id. tit. I, §§ 101, 105, 106. 
5 SeeJoel F. Handier, The Transformation of Aid to Families with Dependent Children: TheFamily 
Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 456, 459 (1987-88) [herein-
after Handler, Transformation of Aid]; see also Jason DeParle, Momentum Builds for Cutting Back 
Welfare System, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1994, at Al [hereinafter DeParle, Momentum Builds) (discuss-
ing proposals of both Democrats and Republicans to increase work obligations). For other 
examples of proposed welfare reform legislation involving workfare components, see S. 246, 
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (Welfare Reforms That Work Act); H.R. 315, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1995) (Work-First Welfare Reform Act of 1995); H.R. 161, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (Work-
fare Incentive Act). 
6 Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 462-63. 
7 Work and Responsibility Act, supra note 3, at § 104. 
B See Michael Kelly, Clinton Presents Hard Line to Bring in North Carolina, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
27, 1992, at A20 (citing then-presidential candidate Clinton's new approach to welfare reform); 
But Go For the jobs, Workfare Works Best With Placement Emphasis, SAN DIEGO UNION-ThIB., June 
17,1994, at BlO; see also MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR 225 (1989) (discussing the 
philosophies of conservatives such as Charles Murray, George Gilder, and Lawrence Mead on 
welfare reform). 
9 But Go For the jobs, Workfare Wmks Best With Placement Emphasis, supra note 8, at B10; see 
also KATZ, supra note 8, at 225. 
10 See Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 459; Joel F. Handler, Constructing the 
Political Spectacle: The Interpretation of Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare 
History, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 899, 906 (1990) [hereinafter Handler, Constructing the Political 
Spectacle); see also KATZ, supra note 8, at 5-8; DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT 27 (1988); 
Patricia L. Sorenson, Women, Work, and Welfare: A Summary of Work Incentives and Work Require-
ments for AFDC Recipients in Michigan, 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 110, 112 (1986); Sylvia A. Law, 
Women, Work, Welfare and the Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1249, 1253 (1983). 
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moral depravity, and that this assumption has been at the heart of 
welfare policy for centuries.u 
Absent from any discussion of workfare, however, is the recogni-
tion that workfare is coerced labor. Indeed, one of the most important 
principles of the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution is that the right to one's labor is inalienable. By forcing welfare 
recipients to work, their right to self-determination is fundamentally 
compromised. The purpose of this Article is to examine workfare in 
the context of the Thirteenth Amendment. This Article will focus on 
an important line of cases from the first part of this century, known as 
the Peonage Cases, which illuminate the parameters of the Amend-
ment and define what constitutes involuntary servitude. 
Part II of this Article will briefly discuss the history of the Thir-
teenth Amendment and will provide a discussion of the Peonage and 
relevant cases that explore the meaning of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment's prohibition against involuntary servitude. Part III will discuss 
the history and development of welfare policy, and will examine the 
sociological attitudes and norms which have traditionally directed this 
policy toward some type of coerced work or workfare. This Part will 
also highlight the significant features of current workfare proposals. 
Finally, this Article will discuss the meaning of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment's prohibition against involuntary servitude in the context of 
workfare, and will analyze how current workfare proposals mirror the 
systems of coerced labor that were struck down by the Peonage Cases. 
II. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PROHIBITION AGAINST 
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE 
A. History oj the Thirteenth Amendment 
The Thirteenth Amendment was the first of three amendments 
added to the United States Constitution in the aftermath of the Civil 
WarP Section 1 of the Amendment bans slavery and involuntary ser-
11 Handler, Constructing the Political Spectacle, supra note 10, at 906; see also KATZ, supra note 
8, at 5-8; ELLWOOD, supra note 10, at 27. 
12 See G. Sidney Buchanan, The QJtest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
12 Hous. L. REv. 331, 331-32 (1975) (pts. 1-8), 13 Hous. L. REv. 64 (1975) (pt. 9). The 
Thirteenth Amendment was passed in 1865, followed by the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, 
and the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870. Id. The text of the Thirteenth Amendment reads as 
follows: Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place 
subject to their jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation. U.S. CaNST. amend. XIII. 
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vitude except as a punishment for duly convicted crimesP The United 
States Supreme Court has held this section to be self-executing.14 In 
contrast, Section 2 of the Amendment is an enabling provision that 
grants to Congress the authority to enact legislation that enforces the 
first section. 15 Despite this two-pronged grant of power, the Thirteenth 
Amendment has played a minor role in United States history.16 It has 
never been a declaration of personal freedom for everyone within the 
jurisdiction of government. 17 This under-utilization of the Amendment 
can be attributed to a Congress that was reluctant to harness the full 
power of the Amendment, and to a Supreme Court that for almost a 
century misinterpreted its meaning. IS 
Congress's reluctance to employ the power of the Thirteenth 
Amendment resulted from the passage of the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments.19 Mter the passage of these Amendments, Con-
gress was more attracted to the source of power they provided than to 
that of the Thirteenth Amendment.2o The reasons behind this change 
in focus are not completely clear, but may be attributed to the prevail-
ing belief that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments would be 
more effective than the Thirteenth Amendment in combatting the 
remaining vestiges or "badges" of slavery that continued to exist in the 
South.21 Furthermore, it was feared that bold enforcement of the Thir-
teenth Amendment would impede the reconciliation process with the 
South.22 
Early judicial interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment largely 
eviscerated any power the Amendment was intended to have.23 Histo-
rians of the Amendment maintain that it was passed not only to abolish 
slavery, but to dismantle the institutional foundations that had sup-
13 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
14 Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 216 (1905). "Self-executing" means that the Amend-
ment has power or force without any ancillary implementing legislation. Id. at 216 (citing Civil 
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20, 23 (1883». 
15Id. at 216. 
16 Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: Consum-
mation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CAL. L. REv. 171, 171 (1951) 
[hereinafter tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment). 
17The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 69 (1872). 
18 See Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition 
Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 71-72 (1990); Buchanan, 
supra note 12, at 334. 
19 See Buchanan, supra note 12, at 334. 
20Id. at 333. 
21 Id. at 334. 
22Id. 
23 See Colbert, supra note 18, at 71. 
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ported it.24 The elimination of chattel bondage was provided by the 
Emancipation Proclamation prior to the passage of the Amendment.25 
Consequently, it seems clear that supporters of the Amendment in-
tended to accomplish something other than the elimination of chattel 
slavery.26 
The Slaughter-House Cases, decided in 1873, were the first cases in 
which the United States Supreme Court considered the meaning of 
the Thirteenth Amendment.27 The case involved the constitutionality 
of a Louisiana statute that granted a business monopoly to a New 
Orleans slaughter-house corporation.28 The statute was challenged by 
local butchers whose livelihood was effectively destroyed as a result of 
the granting of the exclusive monopoly.29 The butchers maintained 
that the statute was a denial of their personal labor rights, and that it 
consequently violated the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against 
involuntary servitude.30 
The Court rejected this claim and upheld the constitutionality of 
the Louisiana law.31 The Court reasoned that the main impetus behind 
the Thirteenth Amendment was to eliminate the institution of Mrican 
24Id. at 33-34. During the legislative debates, most of the arguments in favor of the Thir-
teenth Amendment mirrored traditional abolitionist sentiments that slavery was a moral and 
social perversion. tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 16, at 179--80. Discussion in favor 
of the Amendment also centered around the needs of free blacks whose experiences were not 
much different from those of the newly freed slaves. Id. at 179. Free blacks bore all the indicia 
of slavery, and were only somewhat less degraded and restricted than actual slaves. Id. According 
to supporters, the Thirteenth Amendment would be a practical application of the Declaration of 
Independence's assertion that "all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable Rights." Id. (citing DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)). 
Given the absence of the Southern states at the debates, the traditional arguments in favor 
of slavery went unheard. Id. at 174. Advocates arguing for the necessity of slavery to the cultural 
and economic prosperity of the South, the Christianizing and humanitarian effects of slavery, 
and natural property rights arguments were conspicuously absent from the debate. Id. Instead, 
opponents of the Amendment focused on federalism issues. Colbert, supra note 17, at 33 n.145. 
They relied on the contention that the Amendment was a serious threat to states' rights, and, in 
consideration of the ensuing civil strife, the times were too tumultuous to alter the government. 
Id. 
25 See tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 16, at 179. 
26 See id.; see also Colbert, supra note 18, at 33-34. 
27 83 U.S. 36, 67 (1873). The main holding of the case concerned the interpretation of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 78-79. The Court held 
that the privileges and immunities protected by the Fourteenth Amendment were those of U.S. 
citizenship as opposed to state citizenship. Id. The rights of U.S. citizenship were limited to doing 
business with the government, traveling on the high seas, gaining access to seaports, and assem-
bling and petitioning for redress of grievances. Id. 
28Id. at 83. 
29 Id. at 60. 
30 See id. at 58. 
31 Id. at 82-83. 
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slavery, not the alleged servitude of the local butchers.32 The Court 
did recognize, however, that the term "involuntary servitude" had a 
broader meaning and that its purpose was to forbid all forms and 
conditions of the institution.33 The Court reasoned that if the word 
"slavery" had been used, the purpose of the Amendment might have 
been evaded.34 
Nonetheless, in the Civil Rights Cases of 1883, the Court inter-
preted the Thirteenth Amendment exclusively as a prohibition against 
actual slavery.35 The Court rejected the idea that social or private 
discrimination was an incident of slavery within the purview of the 
Thirteenth Amendment.36 The decision invalidated the Civil Rights Act 
of 1875,37 legislation that sought to protect citizens' rights to the full 
and equal enjoyment of public accommodations, and provided for civil 
remedies when these rights were violated.38 The majority concluded 
that the Thirteenth Amendment was designed as a prohibition against 
the existence of Mrican slavery and did not regulate private social 
behavior.39 
In a vehement dissent, Justice Harlan reiterated the viewpoint of 
the Thirteenth Amendment's original sponsors, that the entire institution 
of slavery, with all of its attendant burdens and disabilities, was intended 
to be eradicated.40 Harlan maintained that the discrimination exercised 
by the defendants was precisely the sort of badge of servitude that 
Congress was permitted to prevent under the Thirteenth Amendment.4l 
32Id. at 68-69. 
33Id. at 69. 
34Id. 
35 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883). 
36Id. The Civil Rights Cases involved five separate defendants who were each charged with 
violating the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Id. at 4. Two of the defendants were indicted for denying 
lodging accommodation to persons of color, two defendants refused to provide accommodations 
at theaters, and one defendant was indicted for denying a black woman a seat in the "ladies car" 
of a train. Id. at 5. 
37Id. at 26. 
38Id. at 9. The legislation was enacted to supplement the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Buchanan, 
supra note 12, at 340. The 1866 legislation was enacted in direct response to the violence directed 
against Southern blacks and the emergence of the "Black Codes," both of which appeared 
immediately after the Civil War in the Confederate states. Colbert, supra note 18, at 39--41. The 
purpose of the "Black Codes" was to curtail the rights of blacks to such an extent that their 
freedom was of little value. Id. at 42. The statutes were characterized by restrictions on travel, 
vagrancy laws, and a legal system that denied blacks civil and criminal rights. Id. at 42 n.194. The 
Civil Rights Act of 1875 sought to extend the 1866 legislation by eliminating the last vestiges of 
slavery: racial discrimination in public places. Buchanan, supra note 12, at 340. 
39 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22-23. 
40Id. at 35 (Harlan, j., dissenting). 
41 Id. at 43. Harlan's perspective was not embraced by the Court until almost eighty-five years 
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Historians conclude that the decisions in the Slaughter-House Cases 
and the Civil Rights Cases, as well as Congress's reluctance to employ 
its power, rendered the Thirteenth Amendment ineffectual for most 
of the current century.42 Indeed, perhaps the only major piece of 
legislation Congress enacted pursuant to its power under the Thir-
teenth Amendment that survived judicial scrutiny was the Anti-Peon-
age Act of 1867.43 
B. The Anti-Peonage Act of 1867 
The Anti-Peonage Act of 1867 nullified all state laws establishing 
or maintaining peonage.44 The system of peonage that developed in 
the Reconstruction South was in direct response to the labor crisis 
resulting from the freedom granted to slaves.45 Poor, primarily black, 
later. Alfred E. Mayer v.Jones, 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (housing discrimination claim supported 
by the Thirteenth Amendment). See Colbert, supra note 18, at 71; see also Buchanan, supra note 
12, at 497. 
42 Colbert, supra note 18, at 59, 71; see also tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 16, 
at 171-72. 
43 See Buchanan, supra note 12, at 597. The anti-peonage laws now contain a civil and criminal 
component. Karen Gross, Debtor as Modem Day Peon, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 165, 177 n.75 
(1990). The civil provisions are contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1988), and the criminal provisions 
are contained in 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (1988). 
44 See The Anti-Peonage Act of 1867, ch. 188, 14 Stat. 546 (1867). The text of the statute is 
as follows: 
Id. 
Section 1990. The holding of any person to service or labor under the system known 
as peonage is abolished and forever prohibited in the Territory of New Mexico, or 
in any other Territory or State of the United States; and all acts, laws, resolutions, 
orders, regulations, or usages of the Territory of New Mexico or of any other 
Territory or State, which have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced, or 
by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or 
enforce, directly or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any 
persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise, are declared 
null and void. Section 5526. Every person who holds, arrests, returns, or causes to 
be held, arrested, or returned, or in any manner aids in the arrest or return of any 
person to a condition of peonage, shall be punished by a fine of not less than one 
thousand nor more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not less than 
one year nor more than five years, or by both. 
Peonage requires forcing an individual to work for a particular employer to repay indebted-
ness. "Peon" is derived from the Spanish word for foot soldier-the lowest rank in the Spanish 
army. Gross, supra note 43, at 178. 
45 See Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the 
Progressive Era, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 646,646 (1982). Although this Article and the relevant case 
law focuses on the system of peonage that existed in the Reconstruction Era South, the South is 
not the only culprit of this practice. Sydney Brodie, The Federally-Secured Right to be Free from 
Bondage, 40 GEO. LJ. 367, 377 (1952). Peonage was also widespread in the American Southwest 
and Mexico. 45 AM. JUR. 2n Involuntary Servitude and Peonage § 10 (1969). In fact, the major 
impetus behind the 1867 Act was to outlaw the system of involuntary servitude brought to the 
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laborers were forced into debt either by stiff fines assessed for phony 
crimes or through labor contracts for which they were paid a small sum 
in advance of their services.46 Based on this indebtedness, they were 
compelled to continue working for their "employer" until the debt was 
fully paid, and they faced criminal sanctions if they refused.47 
In a series of cases decided at the turn of the twentieth century, 
the United States Supreme Court held that state laws supporting and 
imposing peonage violated both the Thirteenth Amendment and the 
federal statutes authorized by it.48 The cases are noteworthy because 
they provided workers with a constitutional shield against forced la-
bor.49 Indeed, of all the cases raising challenges to the freedoms em-
bodied in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments that 
came before the Supreme Court during this time, only the prohibition 
against involuntary servitude received unqualified support. 50 
C. The Peonage Cases 
In the 1905 case of Clyatt v. United States, the Supreme Court held 
that the Anti-Peonage Act of 1867 was constitutionally valid.51 The U.S. 
Government used the statute to convict a Georgia man, Samuel M. 
Clyatt, for retrieving by force two of his former employees whom he 
claimed left their jobs illegally. 52 Although the Court overturned the 
Southwest territories from Mexico, which had inherited the system from Spain. Brodie, supra, at 
376. See also United States v. Ancarola, 1 F. 676, 683-84 (C.C.S.D.N.Y 1880) (young Italian boy 
in New York City held in involuntary servitude). 
46 See Schmidt, supra note 45, at 649. Although most victims of southern peonage were black, 
poor European immigrants from Ellis Island and the slums of New York City were also found in 
the system. Id. at 673. In fact, one historian suggests that it was white peonage that actually 
prompted federal prosecution of the system at the turn of the century. Id. (quoting DANIEL A. 
NOVAK, THE WHEEL OF SERVITUDE (1978». 
47 Schmidt, supra note 45, at 649. These criminal sanctions created even more debt for those 
convicted, and if they were unable to obtain a criminal surety to front the fine, they were forced 
to work off their punishment on the chain gangs. Id. at 651. The chain gangs of this period were 
highly profitable ventures for local government because they leased out this labor to private 
businesses. /d. This profitability created a strong local incentive for convictions. Id. Convicted 
laborers, however, were eager to enter into criminal surety contracts because the chain gangs 
were notorious for their brutality; the death rate was a staggering 20--50%. Id. 
48 See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 150 (1914); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 
219,245 (1911); Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215-16 (1905). Furthermore, almost thirty 
years later, the Supreme Court was forced to reaffirm these holdings by invalidating state statutes 
which enforced surety contracts. See also Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 25 (1944); Taylor v. 
Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 31 (1942) (invalidating state statutes that treated breach of contract as 
presumptive evidence of criminal fraud). 
49 Schmidt, supra note 45, at 648. 
50Id. at 718. 
51 See 197 U.S. at 215-16. 
52 See id. at 219; see also Schmidt, supra note 45, at 660. Clyatt fully believed in the legality of 
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conviction on other grounds, it held that compulsory service based on 
indebtedness constitutes involuntary servitude, and therefore, violates 
both the Thirteenth Amendment and statutory prohibition against 
peonage.53 
Clyatt's attorneys argued that the Anti-Peonage statute did not 
apply to individuals.54 They maintained that both the statute and the 
Thirteenth Amendment were designed only to prevent the states from 
establishing systems of peonage or involuntary servitude. 55 They ar-
gued that when peonage existed as a private wrong, the obligation to 
punish it rested within the powers of the state, not the Federal Gov-
ernment.56 In the alternative, Clyatt's attorneys argued that laws requir-
ing the service or labor of a person in liquidation of a debt or obliga-
tion did not constitute peonage, and thus were not prohibited by the 
statuteY 
The Clyatt Court, however, defined peonage as a status or condi-
tion of compulsory service based upon the indebtedness of the peon 
to the master.58 The central feature of the system was forced servitude 
to satisfY debt. 59 The majority was unconcerned whether the contracted 
service was voluntary or involuntary.6o They concluded that such clas-
his actions. See Schmidt, supra note 45, at 660. A Florida statute provided for the imprisonment 
of laborers if they breached employment contracts while still owing money to their employers. 
Id. Under the statute, Clyatt was able to obtain arrest warrants from the local Florida sheriff. Id. 
Despite this almost customary practice, Clyatt was convicted by a Tallahassee jury and sentenced 
to four years of hard labor. Id. 
53 Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 215-16. Clyatt'S conviction rested on the charge that he returned his 
former employees to a condition of peonage. Id. at 219-20. The Court concluded that in order 
to show the employees were returned to peonage, the government was obligated to produce 
evidence that the employees labored in such conditions originally. Id. at 219-20. Because the 
government failed to produce this evidence, the Court determined that the issue was improperly 
sent to the jury, and accordingly overturned Clyatt's conviction, remanding the case for a new 
trial. Id. at 222. 
54 Id. at 210. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 211. 
57 Id. at 210. Clyatt'S attorn"ys were two prominent Georgia lawyers. Schmidt, supra note 45, 
at 661. They were hired by the operators of turpentine stills and lumber mills in Georgia and 
northern Florida who had pooled their resources to assist in overturning Clyatt's conviction. Id. 
The operators believed that their businesses were in jeopardy unless they were permitted to 
control their labor as they saw fit. Id. 
58 Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 215. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. Whether an action is voluntary or involuntary can be difficult to define. Andrew 
Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 480, 
501 (1990). The philosopher Hegel argued that "if a man is a slave, his own will is responsible." 
Id. (quoting G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 57A, at 239 (T.M. Knox trans., 1952) (1821». 
Hegel contended that at a minimum, slaves participate in their enslavement because they choose 
to submit rather than to risk death by resisting. Id. 
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sifications pertained only to the mode of origin, not to the character 
of the servitude.61 
In addition, the Clyatt Court concluded that regardless of how it 
was created, peonage constituted involuntary servitude.62 As such, it 
was prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment-whether sanctioned 
by state legislation or not.63 The Thirteenth Amendment denounces a 
status or condition, irrespective of the authority by which it is created.64 
In the 1911 case of Bailey v. Alabama, the United States Supreme 
Court extended its definition of peonage.65 The decision centered 
around the conviction of an Alabama man, Alonzo Bailey, for criminal 
fraud. 66 He was prosecuted under an Alabama statute that created 
prima facie evidence of fraud for breach of contract for personal serv-
ices.67 The Court concluded that the purpose of the Alabama statute 
was to compel, under the sanction of the criminal law, the enforcement 
of the contract, and that the statute therefore violated both anti-peon-
age statutes and the Thirteenth Amendment.68 
The Bailey decision stands for the proposition that the Thirteenth 
Amendment protects the inalienability of an individual's right to his 
or her labor.69 Referring to the Clyatt decision, the Court concluded 
that a contract for service is valid only if the contractor can elect at 
any time to break it, and if no law or force compels performance or 
continuation of the service.70 It is the compulsion that is prohibited.71 
Furthermore, the Court determined that a state is not permitted 
to enact statutes that directly or indirectly support systems of involun-
tary servitude.72 The majority stated that the constitutional mandate 
against involuntary servitude would be defeated if state contract law 
could be used to force compulsory service.73 The Court maintained 
61 Clyatt, 197 u.s. at 215. 
62 [d. 
63 See id. at 216-17. 
64 [d. at 216. 
65 219 U.S. 219, 243 (1911). 
66 [d. at 231. 
67Id. at 227. Bailey had entered a one-year labor contract at $12 per month. Id. at 235. He 
was advanced $15 under the stipulation that this amount would be deducted from his monthly 
wage. [d. at 236. Mter about a month of service, Bailey left the job and did not repay the $15 
advance. [d. Under the statute, such conduct created a presumption of fraud, but because 
Alabama evidentiary rules precluded the accused from testifYing on his own behalf, the presump-
tion could not be effectively rebutted. See id. Bailey was convicted, assessed a fine of $30, and 
sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for 136 days. [d. 
68 Bailey, 219 U.S. at 237-38, 245. 
69 See id. at 242; see also Koppelman, supra note 60, at 491. 
70 Bailey, 219 U.S. at 243. 
71 [d. at 242. 
72 [d. at 241-42. 
73 [d. at 242. 
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that although a state may impose servitude as punishment for a crime, 
it may not sanction the subjugation of one person to another. 74 
In the 1914 case of United States v. Reynolds, the Supreme Court 
struck down an Alabama criminal surety statute as violative of the 
Thirteenth Amendment. 75 The statute provided that fines assessed for 
criminal convictions could be paid by a third party, or surety.76 In 
exchange, the convict was obligated to work for the surety for a period 
of time determined by the court.77 The convict's failure to complete the 
contract was a criminal act separate from the original criminal violation, 
and would subject the convict to additional fines and imprisonment.78 
The state of Alabama argued that the statute was constitutional 
under the Thirteenth Amendment's exception for servitude imposed 
as a criminal sanction.79 The Court, however, took exception to the 
constant threat of another possible arrest and prosecution that formed 
the basis of the agreement.80 It reasoned that this form of constant 
coercion rendered the labor compulsory; the convict worked in con-
stant fear that the surety would seek his arrest for violation of the labor 
contract-an action accompanied by new fines and penalties for the 
convict.8! The Court concluded that the practical effect of the criminal 
surety statute was to keep the convict chained to an "ever-turning wheel 
of servitude," and was thus unconstitutionaP2 The Court noted that if 
a state statute either upon its face, or in the manner of its administra-
tion, has the effect of denying constitutional rights, it must fai1. 83 
D. Exceptions to Involuntary Servitude 
The Court has created several exceptions to the Thirteenth Amend-
ment's prohibition against involuntary servitude.84 The most significant 
of these exceptions concerns duties of citizenship.85 For example, the 
74Id. at 244. 
75 235 U.S. 133, 150 (1914). 
76Id. at 142. 
77Id. 
78Id. 
79Id. at 138. 
80Id. at 146. 
81Id. at 14~7. 
82Id. One of the convicts in the case was assessed approximately $60 in fines and costs for 
petit larceny. Id. at 139, 147. Without entering into a surety contract, he would have been required 
to serve a maximum of 68 days at hard labor. Id. at 147. Under the surety contract, however, he 
was required to labor for nine months and twenty-four day. Id. If he failed to perform the service, 
he could be re-arrested and assessed an additional judgment. Id. 
83Id. at 149. 
84 Koppelman, supra note 60, at 518. 
85Id. 
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Court has upheld compulsory military service and requirements that 
able-bodied men help build public roads and bridges.86 The Court has 
determined that however burdensome, duties of citizenship are ines-
capable conditions of freedom.87 The government's ability to compel 
duties of citizenship, however, is not unlimited.88 The exception grants 
to the government only those essential powers without which liberty 
could not be protected.89 
The Court has also stated that the Amendment was not intended 
to introduce novel doctrines.90 Certain services have historically been 
treated as exceptional and have not been regarded within the purview 
of the Thirteenth Amendment.91 This exception for services that have 
traditionally been viewed as unique include the labor of sailors on the 
high seas,92 duties required of children by their parents,93 and com-
mon-law duties imposed upon innkeepers to their guests.94 
In the 1988 case of United States v. Kozminski, the United States 
Supreme Court further limited the meaning of involuntary servitude 
to include an element of physical or legal coercion.95 Kozminski in-
volved the criminal prosecution of a Michigan couple for holding two 
mentally retarded farm hands in involuntary servitude.96 The Court 
86Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918); Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 
(1916). 
87 See Butler, 240 U.S. at 330; see also Koppelman, supra note 60, at 519. 
88 Koppelman, supra note 60, at 519. 
89 Butler, 240 U.S. at 333. 
90 Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 282 (1897). 
91 Id. This construction, however, has been highly criticized because it does not make sense 
for an exception to predate the actual rule. Koppelman, supra note 60, at 525. Under this 
interpretation, black slavery itself would be exempt from the Amendment because it certainly 
had a long historical tradition and was well rooted in the common law. Id. at 525 n.197. 
92 Robertson, 165 U.S. at 288. In dicta, the Robertson majority also maintained that the 
involuntary nature of the servitude existed only at the moment of inception, and not continu-
ously. Id. This proposition was squarely negated after the peonage cases were decided. See Clyatt, 
197 U.S. at 215-16. 
93 Robertson, 165 U.S. at 282. 
94 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (upholding 
requirement of private motel to provide accommodations to black travellers because the Thir-
teenth Amendment was not intended to abrogate common law duties of inn keepers). 
95 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988). The Court's interpretation of "involuntary servitude" specifically 
concerns its construction under two criminal statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 1584. Id. at 934. These 
statutes are the modern day progeny of the early nineteenth century Slave Trade statute (Act of 
Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 91, § 6, 3 Stat. 452). Id. at 946. Although the decision does not directly pertain 
to the self-executing provision of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court specifically construed 
Congress's statutory intent in a way consistent with the understanding of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment that prevailed when the statute was reenacted in 1909. Id. at 945. 
96Id. at 934. In 1983, the victims were found laboring on the Kozminski dairy farm; both 
men were in poor health, living in squalid conditions, and were isolated from the rest of society. 
Id. The lower court reported that the trailer occupied by the men was filthy; it did not have 
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held that involuntary servitude is a condition in which the victim is 
forced to work by the use or threat of physical or legal coercion.97 The 
Court noted that a victim's age or special vulnerability might be rele-
vant in determining the degree of coercion sufficient to hold that 
person in involuntary servitude.98 
In its attempt to define involuntary servitude, the majority turned 
to its past interpretations of the term under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.99 The Court concluded that in past decisions in which a condi-
tion of involuntary servitude was held to exist, the victim had no 
available choice but to work or be subjected to legal sanction. IOO Con-
sequently, the Court did not include psychological coercion as within 
the meaning of involuntary servitude.10l The Court feared that includ-
ing psychological coercion as a factor of involuntary servitude would 
depend entirely upon the victim's state of mind, and would provide no 
objective indication of the type of conduct prohibited by law. 102 
Despite this narrow interpretation of involuntary servitude, the 
Court was clear that its holding did not rule out evidence of other 
means of coercion, of poor working conditions, or of the victim's 
special vulnerabilities.103 The Court noted that these special circum-
stances are not irrelevant in determining whether involuntary servi-
running water, and a broken refrigerator was filled witb maggot-infested food. United States v. 
Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1180, 1188 (6tb Cir. 1987). Furtber evidence suggested tbat on several 
occasions tbe two men left the farm, but were brought back by eitber tbe Kozminskis or otber 
employees. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 935. The men worked on tbe farm seven days a week, often 17 
hours a day, for virtually no pay. Id. Eventually, anotber farm employee contacted county officials 
about tbe men's condition and tbey were placed in an adult foster home. Id. 
97 Knzminski, 487 U.S. at 952. The Supreme Court's decision resolved a conflict in tbe lower 
courts. In 1964, tbe United States Court of Appeals for tbe Second Circuit concluded in United 
States v. Shackney tbat a condition of involuntary servitude was created only tbrough tbe use or 
intended use of physical violence, physical restraint, or immediate imprisonment. 333 F.2d 475, 
486-87 (2d Cir. 1964). Conversely, in 1984, a tbree judge panel of tbe Court of Appeals for tbe 
Nintb Circuit determined in United States v. Mussry tbat involuntary servitude could be coerced 
by a variety of metbods including psychological and economic intimidation. See 726 F.2d 1448, 
1455-56 (9tb Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984). 
98 Knzminski, 487 U.S. at 948. 
99 Id. at 941. 
100 Id. at 943. The Court briefly reviewed its holdings in tbe peonage cases, in which it had 
determined tbat tbe sanction of tbe criminal law to compel service was just as illegitimate as 
physical force. Id.; see Pollock, 322 U.S. at 23-24; Bailey, 219 U.S. at 244; Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 215-16. 
101 Knzminski, 487 U.S. at 944. The majority specifically stated, however, tbat its holding did 
not affect tbe potential scope of tbe Thirteentb Amendment. Id. 
102Id. at 949. For example, an interpretation of involuntary servitude tbat included compul-
sion tbrough psychological coercion could be used to punish a parent who forced an adult son 
or daughter to work in tbe family business by tbreatening witbdrawal of affection. Id. 
103Id. at 952. 
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tude exists.104 Although the physical or legal coercion must exist, spe-
cial vulnerabilities are important in determining whether the coercion 
compelled the victim to serve.105 These other circumstances could be 
relevant to corroborate evidence regarding the coercion employed, the 
defendant's intentions, or the actual causal effect of such conduct.106 
These exceptions and limits on involuntary servitude, however, do 
not undermine the central principles of the Peonage Cases;107 in fact, 
the Peonage Cases are still good law. lOB The fact that they are not often 
cited and are rarely taught in the standard legal curriculum attests not 
to their obscurity, but to their unquestioned vitality.109 The United 
States Supreme Court clearly established that peonage-a system of 
coerced employment in satisfaction of a debt-was unconstitutional.110 
The Peonage Cases embody the most important principle of the Thir-
teenth Amendment: the right to one's labor is inalienable. 
III. THE HISTORY OF POVERTY PROGRAMS 
It is impossible to discuss the coercive nature of workfare outside 
of its historical context. lll Ever since the emergence of the poorhouse 
in medieval England, poverty policy has centered around the question 
of who is excused from work.ll2 Those who are excused from work 
deserve benefits, and those who are capable of working do not. ll3 In a 
104Id. 
105Id. 
106 Id. 
107 See generaUy Koppelman, supra note 60, at 526. 
106 See id. at 491 nA8. 
109 See id. 
110 Bailey v. Alabama, 219 u.S. 219, 243-44 (1911). 
111 For most of this section the author relies on the research of Joel F. Handler, Professor of 
Law at the University of California at Los Angeles. Two of Professor Handler's articles, Construct-
ing the Political spectacle: The Interpretation of Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligations in Social 
Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 899 (1990) and The Transformation of Aid to Families With 
Dependent Children: The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 
456 (1987-88), were invaluable resources in the preparation of this section. For further discussion 
of the history of social welfare programs and legislation, see generally Mark Greenberg, Federal 
Welfare Reform in Light of the California Experience: Early Lessons for State Implementation of the 
JOBS Program, 27 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 419 (1989-90) and KATZ, supra note 8, passim. 
112 Law, supra note 10, at 1252-53. 
113 Handler, Constructing the Political spectacle, supra note 10, at 926. Other characteristics of 
the poor have also factored into this "deserving/undeserving" categorization. See, e.g., KATZ, 
supra note 8, at 215-16 (noting that the poor who do not practice chastity are considered 
undeserving); Johanna Brenner, Towards a Feminist Perspective on Welfare Reform, 2 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 99, 103 (1989) (women of color are more likely than white women to be defined as 
"undeserving"); Sorenson, supra note 10, at 111 (noting that poor who live in non-traditional 
families are considered undeserving). 
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culture that has grown out of the Protestant work ethic, those who fail 
to support their families or who fail to find work are morally deviant 
and undeserving.114 One of the principal categories ofthe undeserving 
poor has been single mothers.ll5 
A. Early A nglo-A merican Poverty Programs 
Because work was an individual-not asocial-responsibility, 116 
unemployment in medieval England was thought to be a result of 
personal character flaws rather than economic conditions.l17 The poor 
were thought of as social deviants-the able-bodied who were unwilling 
to work.ns Consequently, conditions of relief were less desirable than 
conditions of the lowest paid work. 119 The "poorhouse" was the primary 
form of relief during this time, and it was a harsh and brutal place.120 
Starvation, slave labor, and cruel punishment-such as mutilation and 
public beatings-were common features of the poorhouse. 121 These 
hardships were considered necessary so that the deserving poor could 
114 Handler, Constructing the Political Spectacle, supra note 10, at 927. For example, the 
traditional Calvinist view maintained that work was the principal means of achieving God's will, 
and that idleness was a form of human alienation. John Glowacki, Work and Welfare in America: 
A Synthesis Approach, 2 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 243, 246 (1985). 
115 Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 460; see also Martha L. Fineman, Images 
of Mothers in Poverty Discourse, 1991 DUKE LJ. 274, 282-83 (1991). Even the label "single mother" 
suggests a deviance. Fineman, supra, at 291. No one speaks ofa "married mother;" the "normal" 
state of motherhood needs no modification. Id. It is only the deviant form that requires qualifica-
tion, and by implication, justification. Id. 
116Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 467. 
117Jacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and 
Present Status, 16 STAN. L. REv. 257, 277 (1964) [hereinafter tenBroek, California's Dual System]. 
liS Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. LJ. 1499, 
1505 (1991). 
119Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 467. 
120 See Handler, Constructing the Political Spectacle, supra note 10, at 928. Poorhouses were 
erected for the poor on the "wastes and commons within the parish." tenBroek, California's Dual 
System, supra note 117, at 259 (quoting 43 Eliz. 1, ch. 2, § IV (1601) (Eng.) and 39 Eliz. 1, ch. 3, 
§ V (1597) (Eng.». Poorhouses were tax-supported in amounts determined by the local authori-
ties. Id. Poorhouse relief was deliberately stigmatized to discourage people from seeking aid. 
Handler, Constructing the Political Spectacle, supra note 10, at 929. Assignment to the poorhouse 
involved a loss of liberty, a separation from one's family, and horrific living conditions. Handler, 
Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 468. 
Despite this deliberate stigma and harshness of the poorhouse, other forms of relief, such 
as direct hand-outs, were discouraged. These direct hand-outs were thought to increase poverty 
because they failed to distinguish between the worthy and the unworthy. Id. For example, during 
the reign of England's King Henry VIII, able-bodied beggars were required to work, and serious 
penalties were imposed on anyone who gave these individuals alms. tenBroek, California's Dual 
System, supra note 117, at 259. 
121Id. at 277-78. 
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be separated from the undeserving poor.122 If the poor were willing to 
subject themselves to the burdens and horrors of the poorhouse, then 
they were truly destitute.123 
Colonial America transported from England these attitudes about 
the poor. 124 As in England, the early American colonists were clear 
about the limits of social obligation.125 Families were responsible to 
each other, community members had certain mutual obligations, but 
the public owed nothing to strangers.126 
B. Women and Poverty Programs 
Poor women were never morally excused from the paid labor 
force. 127 In fact, prior to the nineteenth century, women from all social 
classes were encouraged to seek paid labor.128 Around the 1830s, how-
ever, forces of the Industrial Revolution gave rise to a new domestic 
code that defined men as wage-earners and women as providers for 
the home.129 
The new domestic code had a particularly harsh effect on poor 
women: they were still expected to work, but they were also accused of 
neglecting their families. 130 This neglect was considered to be at the 
root of crime and delinquency; social reformers during this time ad-
122Id. 
123 Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 468. 
124 See tenBroek, California's Dual System, supra note 117, at 291. For example, in 1834 the 
Reverend Charles Burroughs described pauperism as follows: "[It] is consequence of willful error, 
shameful indolence-vicious habits-consequences of bad principles and morals." KATz, supra 
note 8, at 13. 
125Id. at 6. 
126Id. The settlement provisions of this period were enacted so that communities were only 
required to assist their permanent members. See Colonial Laws of N.Y, 1721, ch. 410; see also 
KATZ, supra note 8, at 11. The poor were literally carted from one town to another--each town 
denying any claim to the "paupers." KATZ, supra note 8, at 11-12. Valuable resources were 
consumed not only in transportation costs but in the ensuing litigation between towns. Id. By the 
nineteenth century, agrarian society was replaced by industrialized urban centers. R.R. PALMER 
&JOEL COLTON, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD TO 1815 248 (6th ed. 1984). As the peasant 
classes migrated in search of work, it became impossible to determine the towns to which the 
poor belonged. See KATZ, supra note 8, at 11-12. Eventually, these settlement provisions were 
altogether abandoned. tenBroek, California's Dual System, supra note 117, at 296. 
127 Handler, Constructing the Political Spectacle, supra note 10, at 907. 
128Id. 
129Id. The reasons for this cultural change can be attributed to a variety of factors. Id. 
Technological advances displaced a large segment of workers, and the resulting competition for 
wages pushed many women into the horne. Id. Furthermore, because factory work necessarily 
took men out of the horne (unlike agrarian labor), social reformers feared that the family unit 
would be destroyed. Id. 
130Id. 
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vocated the removal of children from these homes. 131 These reformers 
focused on what they perceived to be deviant behavior and the trans-
mission of immoral family values.132 By the end of the nineteenth 
century, juvenile courts were created and imbued with the authority to 
save children from delinquency by removing them from their allegedly 
bad environments.133 
As the harsh realities of reformatories, state institutions, and the 
placement of children in Midwestern farms set in, the social reformers 
began advocating a policy of family preservation.134 Between 1911 and 
1921, forty states enacted legislation programs that provided poor 
single women with income support so that they could maintain their 
homes.135 These programs, commonly known as "Mothers' Pensions," 
were met with fierce opposition.136 It was feared that this type of income 
support would encourage single motherhood and decrease the respon-
sibilities of fathers.137 Mothers' Pension programs were also opposed 
by feminists and working-class women because they were thought to 
reinforce the domestic code and to further institutionalize women's 
dependence on men.138 These women argued for higher wages and 
unionization so that women could adequately care for their families. 139 
As a result of this criticism, the programs that developed were 
highly restrictive. l40 Eligibility hinged on whether the women were 
considered "deserving. "141 This determination was based on prevailing 
attitudes about accepted gender roles and sexual codes.142 Women 
who were single, other than by widowhood, were generally denied 
relief, and program participants were overwhelmingly white.143 Once 
131 Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 47l. 
132Id. 
133 Id. 
134Id. 
135Brenner, supra note 113, at 107. 
136Handler, Constructing the Political spectacle, supra note 10, at 910. 
137Id. One well-known social reformer commented that funds would not only be used to 
support deserving widows, but "to the families of those who have deserted and are going to 
desert!" Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 474 & n.72 (citing W. BELL, AID TO 
DEPENDENT CHILDREN 4 (1965) (quoting PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE CARE OF 
DEPENDENT CHILDREN, S. Doc. No. 721, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1909))). 
138Brenner, supra note 113, at 107-08. 
139Id. 
14oHandler, Constructing the Political Spectacle, supra note 10, at 910. 
141 See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 320-21 (1968); see also Handler, Constructing the Political 
Spectacle, supra note 10, at 910 (noting that only a small number of white widows were enrolled 
in the programs). 
142Brenner, supra note 113, at 108. 
143 Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 475 n.76; see also Handler, Constructing 
the Political Spectacle, supra note 10, at 910. State legislation provided for women who were 
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enrolled, mothers were often supervised by caseworkers to verify that 
they provided a suitable home.144 
The effect of these restrictions placed administrative burdens on 
the programs.145 Local administrators complained about the difficulties 
of defining the vague test of unworthiness; they ultimately had to rely 
on gossip and personal judgment. 146 Limited state resources constrained 
the ability to manage the programs effectively, and as a result, the 
programs were limited in scope.147 
C. Women and the New Deal 
At the height of the Depression, the Roosevelt Administration 
faced massive unemployment and threats to social order at all levels of 
government. l48 In response to this growing crisis, the New Deal tar-
geted three basic categories of the poor: (1) the unemployed, (2) the 
elderly, and (3) women and children, when it enacted the Social 
Security Act of 1935.149 
1. Programs for the Unemployed 
Despite the catastrophic economic conditions that existed during 
the Depression, the idea prevailed that there was something morally 
wrong with able-bodied men who required assistance.150 In addition, 
the organized business community was reluctant to fully embrace un-
abandoned, divorced, or never-married, but in practice, these women were usually defined as 
"unfit" and were deemed ineligible for support. Brenner, supra note 113, at 109. In a 1931 survey, 
over 82% of the participants nationwide were widows, and 96% of the participating families were 
white. Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 475 n.76. In North Carolina, only one 
black family was enrolled, and in Houston, Texas, there were no blacks in the program despite 
the fact that 21 % of the city's population was black. Id. 
144 Brenner, supra note 113, at 109. Caseworkers were supposed to supervise home manage-
ment, diet, cleanliness, school attendance, delinquency, and moral behavior. Handler, Transfur-
mation of Aid, supra note 5, at 475 n.77. 
145Id. at 475. 
146Id. 
147Id. In 1930, there were 3,792,902 female headed households, and in a 1931 survey, the 
Children's Bureau reported that only 93,620 families were assisted by Mothers' Pension programs 
that year, or less than 3% of the pool. Id. at 475 n.78. 
148 Handler, Constructing the Political Spectacle, supra note 10, at 912. 
149 Social Security Act, ch. 531, tits. I-IV, 49 Stat. 620, 620-29 (1935) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also ELLWOOD, supra note 10, at 27; Handler, Constructing 
the Political Spectacle, supra note 10, at 912; Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 479. 
The New Deal also provided assistance to the blind. However, public aid to this category of the 
poor was not controversial or criticized because the blind historically have been considered to 
be morally excused from work. See Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 478. 
150 Ross, supra note 118, at 1506. 
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employment relief efforts because such efforts undermined industrial 
discipline.15l These attitudes significantly affected two programs de-
signed to relieve the massive unemployment-work relief and unem-
ployment insurance.152 
Within a year of its implementation, work relief employed between 
1.4 million and 2.4 million people per month, at wages higher than 
both direct relief and market wages.153 The work was voluntary, there 
was no means test, and benefits were given in cash rather than in 
kind. 1M Nonetheless, direct work relief efforts were attacked, and de-
spite their success, the programs were soon significantly scaled back.155 
The Roosevelt Administration preferred a system of unemploy-
ment insurance over work relief. 156 Such a system would not be accom-
panied by the usual stigma of relief; it was for "deserving" workers who 
normally maintained steady, reliable employment.157 The program would 
also be actuarially sound because it would be financed by employee 
contributions and taxes.158 Southern Congressmen, however, afraid of 
programs that intruded into regional labor markets, vetoed proposals 
that did not give primary control of the program to the states.159 
Consequently, the federal government participated financially and es-
tablished general guidelines, but the states administered the funds and 
determined eligibility requirements. l60 Many states denied eligibility to 
151 Handler, Constructing the Political Spectacle. supra note 10, at 913. The need to preserve 
labor markets has historically been a primary argument against poverty relief. Handler, Transfur-
mation of Aid, supra note 5, at 467. 
152 See generally Handler, Constructing the Political Spectacle, supra note 10, at 912-16. 
153Id. at 913 (citing MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POOR HOUSE: A SOCIAL 
HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 219 (1986». 
154Id. at 913 n.47. 
155Id. at 913. Southern legislators exerted pressure to discontinue the program because it 
threatened to upset what was still primarily a plantation economy. Id. Black tenant farmers were 
at the center of this system, and Southern politicians refused to tolerate any federal interference 
in their labor or racial relations. Id. at 913-14. Furthermore, President Roosevelt himself was 
opposed to the work relief programs. Id. at 914. He was concerned about work incentives and 
feared the creation of a large permanent bureaucracy. Id. 
156ELLWOOD, supra note 10, at 28. The preference was a conscious one. President Roosevelt 
commented that by tying benefits to payroll contributions, workers had a "legal, moral and 
political right to collect their pensions." Id. (quoting ARTHUR M. SCHELSINGER,jR., THE COMING 
OF THE NEW DEAL 308 (1959». 
157 Handler, Constructing the Political Spectacle, supra note 10, at 916. Eligibility was denied 
workers who quit without good cause, were fired for misconduct, unavailable for work, refused 
"suitable" work, or were unemployed due to a labor dispute. Handler, Transfurmation of Aid, supra 
note 5, at 485. 
158Id. at 915. 
159Id. at 914-15. 
160 Handler, Transfurmation of Aid, supra note 5, at 484. 
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agricultural and domestic workers, thereby effectively eliminating 
women and blacks from the program.161 
2. The Elderly 
The primary program designed to relieve poverty among the 
elderly, Old Age Insurance (OAI), shared many aspects of the unem-
ployment insurance program.162 Again, President Roosevelt was op-
posed to a program that resembled "the dole. "163 He believed that the 
program would be legitimate only if it were financed by contributions; 
therefore, benefits were tied to earnings.164 The Administration was 
able to sell the program to Congress and the public based on its 
insurance features. 165 
Unlike unemployment insurance, however, the program was ad-
ministered by the federal government.166 Eligibility requirements were 
established nationally, so the program was not vulnerable to local 
political prejudices.167 The reason for this difference rests primarily in 
the nature of the OAI which was to remove workers from the labor 
force. 16B Local control was not considered important where the effects 
of a program did not directly influence existing labor markets.169 
161 Handler, Constructing the Political Spectacle, supra note 10, at 915. 
162 Social Security Act, ch. 531, tit. 1, § 1-6, 49 Stat. 620, 620-22 (1935) (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-306) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). OAl was the precursor to Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI), Pub. L. No. 92-603, tit. III, § 301, 86 Stat. 1465 (1972) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)), which was enacted by Congress 
in 1972 as a comprehensive national program to care for the country's elderly poor and disabled. 
Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 480. While SSI significantly raised benefit levels 
for the elderly poor and the disabled, increases were exclusively limited to people who fell within 
the elderly poor and disabled categories. ELLWOOD, supra note 10, at 37; see also infra note 208. 
163Handler, Constructing the Political Spectacle, supra note 10, at 916. 
164 fd. 
165 fd. at 917. Initially, OAl was viewed with tremendous suspicion. Handler, Transformation 
of Aid, supra note 5, at 478. Most people believed that if one worked hard and saved, one would 
not be destitute in one's old age; relief only assisted the shifty and lazy. fd. Other factors, however, 
contributed to the enactment of OAl: the elderly organized as a political force, young workers 
hoped to move older workers out of the labor market, and young people were reluctant to have 
their parents move back in. Handler, Constructing the Political Spectacle, supra note 10, at 916-17. 
166 fd. at 917. 
167 fd. For example, the program was not means-tested and was available to all laborers once 
they reached the prescribed retirement age. fd. at 916. These features contrasted markedly to 
the state old age assistance programs that existed prior to the enactment of OAl. Handler, 
Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 478. The state programs had long residency requirements 
and strict financial eligibility requirements, placed liens on the recipient's estate, and excluded 
the "morally unfit"-tramps, beggars, convicts, and spouse deserters. fd. 
168 Handler, Constructing the Political spectacle, supra note 10, at 917. 
169 See id. Another aspect of the elderly relief program was Old Age Assistance (OAA). fd. at 
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3. Programs for Women and Children 
The last component of the New Deal programs was Aid to Depend-
ent Children (ADC) .170 For the first time federal funds were established 
to provide financial assistance for needy children in female-headed 
homes. l7l Neither the Administration nor Congress was enthusiastic 
about this relief effort.172 This type of assistance was still accompanied 
by historical stigma; it was the program for the undeserving poor. 173 
Although women reformers had been instrumental in drafting 
ADC legislation and ensuring that it was included in the Social Security 
Act of 1935, the lack of an organized lobbying effort failed to produce 
a program that was significantly different from the state operated 
"Mothers' Pension" programs.174 The programs remained in the con-
trol oflocal authorities,175 and benefit levels for ADC were lower than 
for other programs.176 Eligibility requirements were highly restrictive 
and imposed a variety of moral standards. 177 In general, the states did 
not support the program and Congress did not encourage them to do 
SO.178 
917-19. This program provided direct cash grants to the elderly. Id. It was popular because 
substantial numbers of retirees were not scheduled under OAI to receive benefits until 1942. Id. 
at 918. Once again, however, the South exerted its Congressional power and required local 
administration of programs. Id. The original national standards would have allowed assistance to 
go to aged blacks. Id. Southern politicians thought that as a family subsidy, the OAA grant had 
the potential to disrupt the mostly black tenant farmer labor system. Id. 
170 Social Security Act, ch. 531, tit. IV, §§ 401-406, 49 Stat. 620,627-29 (1935) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-682 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); see also Brenner, supra note 113, at 
110; Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 472-77, 480-83. ADC was the forerunner 
to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which was enacted in 1962. Pub. L. No. 
87-543, tit. I, § 104(a)(1), 76 Stat. 185 (1962) (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. §§601-682 (1988 
& Supp. v. 1993)). Today, AFDC is considered the primary component of welfare. See Brenner, 
supra note 113, at Ill; see also infra notes 186-94 and accompanying text. 
I7! Brenner, supra note 113, at 110. 
172Handler, Constructing the Political Spectacle, supra note 10, at 918. 
173 See KATZ, supra note 8, at 231. 
174 See Brenner, supra note 113, at 110. 
175 See Handler, Constructing the Political Spectacle, supra note 10, at 919. In 1939, amendments 
to the Social Security Act effectively removed widows from ADC by tying their benefit levels to 
the insurance programs that once protected their now deceased husbands. See Brenner, supra 
note 113, at 110-11. As such, benefit levels and eligibility determinations for these women were 
set by the federal government. Id. 
176Handler, Constructing the Political Spectacle, supra note 10, at 919. 
177 Id. Surprise raids were made on welfare mothers to search for "a man in the house." 
Brenner, supra note 113, at 111. The presence of a man would automatically disqualifY the 
recipient. Id. In addition, caseworkers could terminate benefits if they discovered such luxuries 
as telephones during these surprise visits. ELLWOOD, supra note 10, at 30. 
178Handler, Constructing the Political Spectacle, supra note 10, at 919. 
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D. The Rise and Decline oj the "War on Poverty" Programs 
During the Post-New Deal period, poverty relief for female-headed 
households was primarily a state and local matter, and workfare was a 
common feature of many of these programs.179 For example, it was 
common practice in many states to close down welfare offices when 
crops had to be harvested.180 A concerted federal effort to implement 
workfare, however, did not occur until the late 1960s.181 
By the late 1950s the state stronghold on ADC had somewhat 
loosened, and Southern congressional power had declined dramati-
cally.182 In addition, Michael Harrington's pivotal book, The Other Amer-
ica, chronicling the plight of the poor, had a profound effect on both 
the Kennedy Administration and the public. 183 For the first time since 
the Great Depression, the nation's conscience was troubled about the 
depth and breadth of poverty.184 Benefits were increased and many of 
the severe eligibility requirements were eliminated.185 In 1962, ADC was 
changed to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) , 186 the 
primary component of current welfare programs. For the first time, 
two-parent families became eligible for assistance.187 The ''War on Pov-
erty" implemented expansive new social service programs including 
179Id. In 1967, twenty states had explicit'work requirements, and several states had presump-
tive work requirements. Law, supra note 10, at 1258 n.27. 
180 Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 488. 
181 Law, supra note 10, at 1261; see also Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 489. 
182Handler, Constructing the Political spectacle, supra note 10, at 920. As agriculture became 
more mechanized, the South no longer relied on black labor. Id. The political forces of the Civil 
Rights movement and the massive migration of blacks to the North diminished the control 
historically exerted by the South over its black population. Id. 
183 KATZ, supra note 8, at 20. Harrington's book described in vivid detail the realities of some 
40 to 50 million poor people in America. MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA 1 (1962). 
He described a "culture of poverty"-the poor were different from the rich in ways more 
profound than a lack of money. Id. at 17. The poor had a separate language, psychology, and 
world view; they were "internal aliens" within the dominant culture. Id. at 18. 
184 See KATZ, supra note 8, at 20. 
185Handler, Constructing the Political Spectacle, supra note 10, at 922-23. Between 1965 and 
1970, AFDC levels had increased by 36%. Brenner, supra note 113, at 113 (citing IRWIN GARFINKEL 
& SARA S. MCLANAHAN, SINGLE MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN: AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 110-14 
(1986) ). In addition, the Supreme Court invalidated a variety of state imposed welfare restrictions. 
E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (striking down denial of hearings prior to 
termination of benefits); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969) (striking down one-year 
residency requirement prior to any award of welfare benefits); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 
(1968) (striking down denial of benefits to families where mother was sexually involved with 
able-bodied man); see also KATZ, supra note 8, at 107. 
186 See supra note 170. 
187Brenner, supra note 113, at 111. 
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counseling and rehabilitative services, as well as early education and 
nutrition intervention.188 
The effect of these changes caused the welfare rolls to expand 
significantly.189 Black and never-married women, who historically had 
been denied access to poverty relief programs, comprised an increas-
ing proportion of the welfare programs. 190 As the number of recipients 
increased, so did the cost, and public and political support for the new 
AFDC program began to disappear. 191 Congress believed that the mar-
ket could support all those who wanted to work and thought the new 
face of welfare undermined family stability and destroyed incentives to 
work.192 Congress also believed that welfare recipients had inappropri-
ately high standards for what constituted acceptable work. 193 In an 
effort to reduce the burgeoning welfare rolls by putting welfare recipi-
ents to work, Congress enacted the Work Incentives Programs (WIN) 
in 1967.194 
The program required AFDC recipients to participate in employ-
ment or job training programS.195 At first, WIN was voluntary for women.l96 
Job training assessment was conducted by local employment service 
agencies after appropriate referrals were made from the welfare de-
partment.197 This assessment categorized recipients into three main 
categories: (1) the immediately employable, (2) the potentially em-
ployable (those who could benefit from training), and (3) the unem-
IBB See id. In this author's opinion and experience, Operation Headstart and Women, Infants 
and Children (WIC) were among the most successful of these programs. 
IB9ELLWOOD, supra note 10, tbl. 2.1, at 32 (showing an expenditure increase of $14 billion 
in AFDC from 1960-1976); Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 489. 
190 Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 489. Between 1950 and 1965, the number 
of AFDC recipients had increased about 6% per year, but between 1965 and 1970, the annual 
rate of growth rose to 18%. Brenner, supra note 113, at 112 (citing Y. HASENFELD, WELFARE AND 
WORK: THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF MORAL AMBIGUITY 28 (U. of Cal. Institute of Industrial 
Relations Working Paper No. 147 (1987»). 
191 See Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 489. Real expenditures for public 
benefits increased by 69% between 1965 and 1970. Brenner, supra note 113, at 113 (citing IRWIN 
GARFINKEL & SARA S. MCLANAHAN, SINGLE MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN: AN AMERICAN 
DILEMMA 110-14 (1986». Support also waned because welfare recipients possessed traditionally 
deviant and morally suspect features: they were non-working, non-married, and non-white. See 
Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 489. 
192Handler, Constructing the Political Spectacle, supra note 10, at 924. 
193Id. 
194 Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 489. 
195 Michyle A. LaPedis, Note, California W(fT'kfare Legislation and the Right to Privacy, 13 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 761, 762 (1986). 
196 Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 490. 
197Id. at 489. 
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ployable.198 Because resources were very limited, local administrators 
allocated resources to those who were most likely to succeed.199 
In an effort to toughen the work requirements, Congress passed 
the Talmadge Amendments in 1971 (WIN 11).200 The focus of WIN II 
was changed from education and training to actual job placement.201 
It was no longer a voluntary program, and mothers with children above 
the age of six were required to participate.202 Although Congress pro-
vided over $300 million for this program, resources were scarce, and 
few participants were actually placed in good paying jobs.203 
At about this same time, the federal agency managing the AFDC 
introduced Quality Contro1.204 The purpose of Quality Control was to 
reduce overpayments and eliminate the ineligible from welfare rolls.205 
The new regulations threatened states with substantial penalties for 
erroneous payments but not for denials to eligible applicants.206 The 
result was that extreme verification requirements developed.207 Pro-
grams became computerized, clerical workers replaced social workers, 
there was close supervision, and AFDC became markedly more bureau-
cratic and rule-bound.208 
198Id. 
199 Handler, Constructing the Political Spectacle, supra note 10, at 924. This practice-known 
as "creaming" -is perhaps responsible for the modest gains in earnings reported for participants 
who were placed in the work force, and for the modest decrease in grant levels. See Handler, 
Transfurmation of Aid, supra note 5, at 490; Handler, Constructing the Political Spectacle, supra note 
10, at 924. 
Another important feature of WIN designed to provide work incentives was "income disre-
gard." Sorenson, supra note 10, at 112. This feature permitted AFDC recipients to keep the first 
$30 and the remaining one-third of any earned income without a corresponding decrease in 
their welfare grant. Id. It also allowed deductions for actual and verifiable work expenses such as 
child care and transportation. Id. 
200 Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 490. 
201Id. 
202Id. 
203Id. at 491. The average amount of funding available per recipient was only $250. Id. 
Overall, only about 20% of the total welfare caseload was able to actively participate in the 
program, and of these, only about 2% were placed in jobs, one-third at less than the minimum 
wage.Id. 
204 Handler, Constructing the Political Spectacle, supra note 10, at 923. Quality Control was a 
regulatory scheme developed in response to the growth of AFDC. See Timothy J. Casey & Mary 
R. Mannix, Qy.ality Control in Public Assistance: Victimizing the Poor Through One-Sided Account-
ability, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1381, 1382 (1989). 
205 See Handler, Transfurmation of Aid, supra note 5, at 493. At first, the agency required states 
to audit both overpayments and denials to measure error and evaluate their causes. See Casey & 
Mannix, supra note 204, at 1382. In April 1973, however, the agency eliminated denial review 
from its Quality Control system. Id. (citing 38 Fed. Reg. 8743-44 (1973». 
206 Timothy J. Casey, The Family Support Act of 1988: Molehill or Mountain, Retreat or Reform, 
23 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 930, 934-35 (1989). 
207Id. at 934. 
208 Handler, Constructing the Political Spectacle, supra note 10, at 923. Activity was also occur-
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E. The Reagan Years-State Experiments with Workfare 
Shortly after taking office in 1981, the Reagan Administration 
sought to further reduce welfare rolls by toughening work require-
ments.209 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA) 
changed significant elements of the AFDC grant calculation for work-
ing recipients.210 Although it did not impose mandated workfare, it did 
allow several states to experiment with a variety of workfare models.211 
One aspect of OBRA was Community Work Experience (CWEP) , which 
gave states explicit authority to require recipients to participate in 
workfare jobs, and allowed states to divert a portion of the welfare grant 
to subsidize employment.212 
A typical example of these state experiments was California's Greater 
Avenues for Independence (GAIN) program.213 GAIN required that all 
able-bodied welfare recipients who did not care for a child under six 
enter into a formal contract with the state. 214 These contracts detailed 
ring in other poverty relief programs during this time. See id. at 921. In 1972, Old Age Assistance, 
Aid to the Blind, and Aid to the Totally and Permanently Disabled (which had been established 
in 1954) were combined into Supplemental Security Income (SSI). See supra note 162. The 
program was completely federally funded, and was administered nationally, with federal eligibility 
requirements and uniform grant levels. Handler, Constructing the Political Spectacle, supra note 
10, at 921. 
In 1968 and 1974, numerous changes were also made to the former Old Age Insurance 
program (OAI). Id. Benefits were raised substantially and indexed to the cost of living. Id. Today, 
Social Security is a major source of income for most elderly Americans, and, according to one 
scholar, it has significantly reduced poverty among the elderly and is comparable to the most 
advanced support systems in Western Europe. Id. 
209 Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 491. The Reagan Administration's phi-
losophy was prompted by a belief that welfare was utilized by those who were not truly needy. Id. 
President Reagan himself expressed this philosophy when he commented: "There's a woman in 
Chicago. She has 80 names, 30 addresses, 12 social security cards, and is collecting veteran's 
benefits on four non-existing deceased husbands .... She's got Medicaid, is getting food stamps 
and ... welfare under each of her names. Her tax-free cash income alone is over $150,000." 
DeParle, Better Work Than Welfare, supra note 1, at 48 (quoting Ronald Reagan, Feb. 14, 1976). 
210 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 2301-2321, 95 Stat. 
357, 84~0 (1981) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also Brenner, 
supra note 113, at 116; Sorenson, supra note 10, at 112. For example, the $30 and one-third 
earned "income disregard" was eliminated after four months of consecutive employment. Soren-
son, supra note 10, at 112. This meant that after four months, AFDC grants were reduced by one 
dollar for every dollar earned. Id. Furthermore, deductions for child care, transportation, and 
other work-related expenses were allowable only up to specified maximum monthly amounts. Id. 
211 Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 492. 
212Id. By September of 1985, 23 states had CWEP and 12 had implemented job search 
programs. Id. In addition, Congress authorized experiments in work-relief in eight states. Id. The 
programs ranged from voluntary job training in New Jersey to straight work-for-relief in West 
Virginia. Id. 
213Id. at 494; see also Sorenson, supra note 10, at 110 (discussing a variety of employment, 
training, and workfare programs implemented in Michigan). 
214LaPedis, supra note 195, at 766. 
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both the services provided by the state and the recipient's correspond-
ing obligations.215 Once the state met its training and educational 
services obligations, a recipient had approximately 90 days to find 
employment.216 If employment was not obtained within that period, 
recipients were required to enter a workfare program.217 
The workfare jobs in California were with public and private 
non-profit employers.218 The workfare position did not need to be the 
one for which the participant was trained; it only needed to be "re-
lated. "219 The number of hours of labor required was computed based 
on an average entry-level wage.220 Recipients did not receive unemploy-
ment benefits, sick time, vacation, or any other benefits associated with 
employee statuS.221 Refusals to comply without good cause were sanc-
tioned.222 
Both liberals and conservatives heralded CWEP programs such as 
GAIN.223 Liberals viewed them as tools of empowerment, and conser-
vatives valued explicit agreements that placed mutual obligations on 
welfare recipients.224 The popularity of CWEP was heightened in light 
of an intensive eight state study by the Manpower Demonstration 
Research Corporation (MDRC) that indicated that CWEP results were 
"promising-although not large and dramatic."225 The new style work-
fare was placed high on the national agenda when, in 1985, it was given 
2151d. at 766-68. For example, the contract specifies whether the state is obligated to provide 
transportation, literacy training, English as a Second Language (ESL) programs, or child care 
services, and outlines the participant's responsibilities. ld. at 767. Sanctions for noncompliance 
are also described in this document. ld. 
2161d. at 768. 
2171d. at 768-69. To obtain employment that exceeds or matches AFDC benefit levels includ-
ing food stamps and medicaid, a recipient would have to find a job with a starting wage of at 
least $8.00 per hour. Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 497. In 1989, the average 
starting wage in California was $5.80 per hour. ld. 
218 Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 497. Statutory limits exist as to the kind 
of positions that GAIN participants may take. LaPedis, supra note 195, at 770. The work relief 
programs may not operate in any manner so as to disadvantage current employees. ld. For 
example, recipients may not be placed in any positions created as a result of budget reductions, 
valid labor disputes, or positions that would otherwise be promotional opportunities for current 
employees. ld. Although designed to protect the current work force, these restrictions effectively 
deny GAIN work relief participants meaningful employment. ld. at 771. 
219 Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 498. 
220ld. at 497. 
2211d. 
222 LaPedis, supra note 195, at 771. Noncompliance initially results in the replacement of 
cash grants with a system of money management or vendor and third party payments. ld. Mter 
three months of continued noncompliance, or in the event of second offenses, benefit levels are 
reduced or terminated for up to six months. ld. 
223 Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 494. 
2241d. 
225 KATZ, supra note 8, at 226. 
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bipartisan support by the National Governor's Association.226 By 1987, 
both the House and the Senate had introduced welfare reform legis-
lation,227 and in 1988, the Family Support Act was passed.228 
F. The Family Support Act of 1988 
The Family Support Act of 1988 (FSA) effectively codified state 
workfare options.229 The statute outlined a broad federal program for 
public training, education, and workfare known as Job Opportunities 
and Basic Skills (JOBS).230 JOBS required that states provide basic 
education, job skill training, job readiness activities, and job develop-
ment and placement.231 States were also required to provide at least 
two of the following: individual job search assistance, on-thejob train-
ing, work supplementation, and workfare. 232 Generally, a state had full 
discretion either to focus on education and training, or on job search 
and work relief.233 
Participation in JOBS was mandatory for AFDC recipients,234 but 
the program did provide a few exemptions.235 For example, women 
with children under three years of age were not required to partici-
pate,236 and states had to guarantee to the recipients child care and 
transportation if needed.237 In addition, participants who cared for a 
226Id. 
227Id. at 226--29. 
228 Family Support Act, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
229 Handler, Constructing the Political Spectacle, supra note 10, at 925. This Article addresses 
only the workfare aspects of the FSA. Other sections of the FSA relate to child support enforce-
ment, child care and medical assistance, and other various AFDC amendments. Family Support 
Act, tit. I, §§ 101-129; tit. II, §§ 201-204; tit. IV, §§ 401-406. 
23°42 U.S.C. § 682(d) (1)(A) (i)(I)-(IV) (1988); see also Greenberg, supra note Ill, at 421; 
Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 502; Casey, supra note 205, at 935. 
231 42 U.S.C. § 682(d)(l) (A)(i) (I)-(IV). Literacy and English proficiency programs were 
included in this education component. § 682(d)(l) (A)(i) (I). 
232 42 U.S.C. § 682(d) (1)(A) (ii)(I)-(IV). Each of these activities is described in full at 42 
U.S.C. § 682(e)-(g). 
233 See 42 U.S.C. § 682(d)(l) (B); see also Handler, Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 504. 
This discretion has caused some critics to fear that the more prosperous and liberal states will 
have programs that are less punitive and provide more services than those in the more conser-
vative and poorer states. Brenner, supra note 113, at 123. 
234 42 U.S.c. § 602(a) (19) (B) (i)(I) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
235 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (19) (C) (i)-(vii). 
236 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (19)(C) (iii) (I). 
237 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (19) (F) (iv). States may, however, apply for a waiver compelling women 
with children no younger than one year old to participate. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(D). This 
provision contrasts markedly with a similar provision under WIN that exempted women with 
children under six. Casey, supra note 205, at 936. Furthermore, states also have discretion as to 
the nature and extent of child care and supportive services that a participant will receive. 
Greenberg, supra note Ill, at 432. 
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child below the age of six were not required to participate for more 
than 20 hours per week.238 
The FSA also codified the salient features of state-implemented 
workfare programs.239 The statute provided that the maximum number 
of hours a recipient could work was determined by dividing his or her 
grant by the minimum wage.240 In addition, workfare assignments had 
to be limited to some sort of public service and, where possible, the 
prior training, experience, and skills of the recipient were to be con-
sidered in determining the actual placement.241 There were also restric-
tions preventing states from forcing recipients to take jobs which low-
ered their standard of living.242 Sanctions for failure to participate in the 
program were directed only at the parental portion of the family grant.243 
G. Current Welfare Reform Proposals 
As Governor of Arkansas, Bill Clinton was a major force behind 
the FSA.244 Consequently, the Clinton Administration's Work and Re-
238 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19) (C) (iii) (II). 
239 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 682(f). 
24°42 U.S.C. § 682(f) (1)(B) (i). 
24142 U .S.C. § 682 (f) (1) (A). 
242 See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (19) (B) (iv). For those participants who found non-subsidized em-
ployment, the FSA increased the maximum child care and work expense "income disregard" 
deductions. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (8) (A). Furthermore, the FSA provided chi1dcare and health 
care subsidies for one year after an individual left welfare for employment. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 602(g) (1) (A) (iii). 
243 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19) (G) (i) (I)-(II). Generally, the sanction period lasts for as long as 
the participant refuses to comply, but after the second failure to comply, the sanction period 
lasts for at least three months, regardless of when the failure to comply ceases. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 602(a) (19) (G)(ii) (1)-(11). The third instance of non-compliance results in a sanction period 
of at least six months, even if the non-compliance ceases before that time. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 602(a)(19) (G) (ii)(III). 
The effectiveness of the FSA has been the subject of wide criticism. Casey, supra note 205, 
at 935; Mickey Kaus, Welfare Waffle: What's That Again Bill? Bill Clinton Reform Plans, NEW 
REpUBLIC, Oct. 12, 1992, at 10 [hereinafter Kaus, Welfare Waffle] (noting marginal results ofFSA). 
For example, little evidence exists that the expanded workfare programs under the FSA were 
effective in reducing poverty. Casey, supra note 205, at 935. In a recent study of six state programs 
that generally emphasized job search and/or workfare, the programs had no measurable effect 
on earnings. Id. In the programs where a positive effect was found, the largest percentage 
difference between employment in workfare participants versus nonparticipants was 5.6%. Id. 
In addition, critics are concerned that recipients will not receive any real skills or training. 
Brenner, supra note 113, at 101. Serious education and training programs are expensive. Handler, 
Transformation of Aid, supra note 5, at 503. Because federal matching funds are statutorily capped 
and many states are operating under budget deficits, it is feared that most states will opt in favor 
of workfare programs which are cheaper to operate and generally fail to offer substantive training. 
Id.; Brenner, supra note 113, at 101. 
244 Gwen Ifill, The 1992 Campaign: The Democrats; Clinton Presses Welfare Overhaul, Stressing 
Job Training and Work, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1992, at Al [hereinafter Ifill, The 1992 Campaign]; 
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sponsibility Act of 1994 closely mirrors the FSA, especially with respect 
to the workfare component.245 The Clinton Plan, however, offers a 
more strident approach to workfare than the FSA.246 This approach is 
partly due to President Clinton's criticism of the FSA, which he felt 
never really went far enough,247 and the competition that the Admini-
stration is experiencing from Republicans with respect to welfare re-
form.248 Each group wants to be able to take credit for a "get tough" 
policy, and as such, current workfare proposals offer recipients fewer 
options and fewer benefits, such as job training and counseling, than 
did previous experiments with workfare. 
The main "get tough" feature of the Clinton Plan is a two-year 
lifetime limit on welfare.249 Mter two years, welfare recipients would 
have to work, preferably in the private sector, but in public service jobs 
if necessary. 250 The workfare component of the Plan is limited, however, 
Kaus, Welfare Waffle, supra note 243, at lO. The National Governors Association (NGA) was a 
strong proponent of the FSA because of its emphasis on state-<:ontrol and its support of workfare. 
KATZ, supra note 8, at 226. During this time, Bill Clinton was Governor of Arkansas and chair-
person of the NGA from 1986 through 1987. Editorial, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 11, 1992, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File. 
245 Compare Work and Responsibility Act, supra note 3, tit. I Oobs); tit. II (Work) with 42 
U.S.C. §§ 602, 681, 682. Indeed, the Work and Responsibility Act specifically refers to JOBS 
programs created under the FSA. Compare Work and Responsibility Act, supra note 3, § lOl (a) 
(Requirement to Participate in Enhanced JOBS Program) with 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(19), 682. 
246For example, the FSA does not include any mandatory cut off provisions, whereas the 
Work and Responsibility Act terminates benefits for welfare recipients who, after 24 months, 
refuse to participate in WORK programs. Work and Responsibility Act, supra note 3, § 104 
(Twenty-four Month Limit). The FSA also exempts participation for individuals who have a child 
less than three years of age, whereas the Work and Responsibility Act exemptions exist only for 
individuals who have a child less than one year of age. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (l9)(C)(iii) (I) 
with Work and Responsibility Act, supra note 3, § 101 (a). 
247 Ifill, The 1992 Campaign, supra note 244, at A20. 
248 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
249 Work and Responsibility Act, supra note 3, § 104 (AFDC will not be payable after twenty-
four month period if certain conditions are not met); see also Study Sees Challenges of Welfare, 
COMM. APPEAL (Memphis), June 22, 1994, at 4A. The Clinton Plan does, however, provide for 
increased education, training, and job placement. Clinton Bill Proposes Benefits Time Limit, FACTS 
ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST, July 21, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File 
[hereinafter Clinton Bill Proposes Benefit Time Limit]. For example, it provides a $4 billion 
allocation for child care, and a $400 million allocation for a campaign to educate against teenage 
pregnancy. Id. Welfare recipients would also be allowed to earn additional money without loss of 
benefits. Id. 
250Work and Responsibility Act, supra note 3, § 101 (a); see also Welfare Reform in America-
You Say You Want A Revolution, ECONOMIST, June 18, 1994, at 21. Clinton's ideas have been 
strongly influenced by Harvard professor David Ellwood, whose 1988 book Poor Support has 
recently been popular in policy circles. Jason DeParle, Arkansas Pushes Plan To Break Welfare 
Cycle, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1992, at AlO. For example, the two-year time limit is a position 
advocated by Professor Ellwood, who now serves as an advisor to President Clinton. Id. 
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to individuals born after 1971.251 The public sector jobs, known as 
WORK jobs, would be offered only as a last resort.252 These jobs are 
likely to pay less than the minimum wage, so that participants are 
encouraged to move on to private sector jobs that pay the minimum 
wage.253 According to one proponent of the Plan, "[i]t would be grossly 
unfair to give some Americans access to better jobs just because they 
become single mothers and went on welfare."254 In addition, the pro-
gram allows recipients to stay in WORK jobs indefinitely, as long as 
they can prove they made an effort to find other work.255 The Clinton 
Plan severs benefits only if welfare recipients refuse to work.256 
This provision of the Clinton Plan has drawn criticism from Re-
publicans and conservative Democrats who argue that it does nothing 
to eliminate dependency on the Government. 257 The Republican coun-
terpart to the Clinton Plan offers more stringent curbs on aid to the 
poor.258 For example, one year after its enactment, the Republican Plan 
would eliminate AFDC, food stamps, and housing benefits to women 
under 21 who have children outside of marriage259 and would eliminate 
public assistance to women who have additional children.26o The Re-
publicans propose that savings from these cuts would go directly to 
other forms of care such as adoptions or supervised group homes for 
young unmarried women and their children.261 
Conservatives also take strong exception to the exemption for 
parents born before 1971,262 They argue that the exemption will elimi-
251 Work and Responsibility Act, supra note 3, § 101 (a). The Administration estimates that 
this group would make up only about one-third of all adults enrolled in AFDC in 1996, but would 
comprise two-thirds of adult recipients by the year 2004. Clinton Bill Proposes Benefits Time Limit, 
supra note 249. 
252 Work and Responsibility Act, supra note 3, § 101 (a). 
253 Welfare Reform Revision: Limiting Cash Payments, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human 
Resources of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of 
Mickey Kaus, Senior Editor, The New Republic) reprinted in FEDERAL DOCUMENT CLEARINGHOUSE 
CONG. TESTIMONY, Aug. 16, 1994 available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File [hereinafter 
Statement of Mickey Kaus]. 
254Id. 
255 Work and Responsibility Act, supra note 3, § 104; see also Clinton Bill Proposes Benefits Time 
Limit, supra note 249. 
256Work and Responsibility Act, supra note 3, § 104. 
257 Clinton Bill Proposes Benefits Time Limit, supra note 249. 
258 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
259 Personal Responsibility Act of 1995, supra note 4, §§ 105 (Denial of AFDC for certain 
children born out-of-wedlock), 107 (State option to deny AFDC benefits to children born out-of-
wedlock to individuals 18, 19, or 20, and to deny such benefits and housing benefits to such 
individuals) . 
260 Personal Responsibility Act, supra note 4, § 106 (Denial of AFDC for additional children). 
261 Robert Rector, How Bill Clinton's Bill Extends Welfare as We Know It, HERITAGE FOUNDA-
TION REpORTS, Aug. 1, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. 
262Id. 
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nate almost 80% of the current AFDC caseload from work require-
ments.263 The Republican Plan calls for a much wider expansion of 
workfare, requiring 1.5 million recipients to join a work program by 
the year 2000, in contrast to the estimated 400,000 under the Clinton 
Plan.264 Republicans would pay for their plan by permanently denying 
welfare benefits to young unmarried mothers and by denying all aid 
to legal immigrants.265 
Certainly, there are significant differences between the Clinton 
Administration's and the Republicans' welfare reform plans. Despite 
the Republican stronghold in Congress, it remains unclear which plan 
will emerge as legislation.266 It is clear, however, that any plan labelled 
"welfare reform" will contain some form of state-mandated work or 
workfare, because poverty policy has historically been focused around 
work. 267 
IV. WORKFARE AS A VIOLATION OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT'S 
PROHIBITION AGAINST INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE 
A. The Right to Individual Labor 
The property which every man has is his own labor, as it is 
the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most 
sacred and inviolable.268 
Control over one's own labor, or self-ownership, is uniquely tied 
to an individual's sense of worth and dignity.269 In our society, self-own-
ership is a deeply ingrained idea of what it means to be a full person.270 
When this control is removed from individuals, they are cast into a 
category of persons deemed inferior and unworthy.271 With its imposi-
tion of mandatory work requirements, modern workfare denies the 
263Id. 
264 DeParle, Momentum Builds, supra note 5, at A30. 
265 Personal Responsibility Act, supra note 4, §§ 105, 106, 107,401. 
266 Some congressional Republicans have characterized some features of the Republican Plan 
as "unduly harsh." DeParle, Momentum Builds, supra note 5, at A30. Moreover, public opinion is 
fickle. Id. The public that currently rallies for "welfare reform" may have less support for a 
program defined as "reducing aid to the poor." Id. To date, neither the Republican Plan nor the 
Clinton Plan has been enacted into law. 
267 See supra part III. 
268The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 110 (1883) (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH 
OF NATIONS 151 (1776)). 
269Koppelman, supra note 60, at 494. 
270Id. 
271 Id. at 495. 
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poor this self-ownership and control. Consequently, the poor are once 
again denied societal notions of dignity. 
The purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment, especially given its 
interpretation in the Peonage Cases, was to assure that such control 
and self-ownership were inviolate.272 This principle of free labor is so 
thoroughly embedded in the foundation of constitutional law that it 
has not been challenged for years.273 Mandatory workfare programs, 
however, once again raise the specter of impermissible involuntary 
servitude. 
B. Workfare as Peonage 
The similarities between the nineteenth century systems of peon-
age and modern workfare programs are striking. Workfare, like peon-
age, exacts mandatory labor as satisfaction for a debt, and imposes 
legal sanctions for nonperformance. With workfare, the state assumes 
the position of the former "employer," and the debt to be paid is the 
welfare grant itself. 
Workfare is a form of peonage because welfare recipients-like 
the victims in Clyatt and Bailey-lack any effective choice whether to 
continue their employment contract.274 Under workfare proposals, the 
state designs the specific operational details of the workfare program.275 
It is of no consequence that recipients may dislike their assignments, 
have child care or transportation conflicts, or experience discrimina-
tion or harassment in their workfare placements.276 Unless they "choose" 
to forfeit their welfare grant, workfare participants are compelled to 
continue working.277 
Under peonage, nonperformance brought criminal sanctions, and 
under workfare, nonperformance results in the termination of benefits. 
However, these benefits are more than just economic assistance; they 
are a legal entitlement. As such, termination of these benefits consti-
272 See e.g., Pollack v. Williams, 322 u.s. 4, 25 (1944); Taylorv. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 31 (1942); 
United Statesv. Reynolds, 235 U.s. 133,150 (1914); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 u.s. 219, 245 (1911); 
Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.s. 207, 216 (1905). 
273Koppelman, supra note 60, at 491 nA8. 
274 197 U.S. at 216; 219 U.s. at 245. 
275 State control over workfare programs is best exemplified in the Clinton Plan. See Work 
and Responsibility Act, supra note 3, §§ 101-207 (establishing states' workfare requirements for 
welfare recipients). 
276 For example, voluntarily leaving a WORK placement constitutes a failure to meet program 
requirements and is subject to a variety of sanctions. See id. at § 201. Moreover, the Work and 
Responsibility Act provides only for discretionary child care services. Id. 
277 See id. (proposing to sanction welfare recipients' failure to participate in program). 
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tutes a legal sanction. Because this sanction is imposed for a failure to 
provide employment services, workfare, like peonage, represents a 
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
It cannot be argued that workfare benefits are merely compensa-
tion for services provided as in a typical employer-employee relation-
ship. Welfare recipients are statutorily entitled to their cash benefits as 
long as they meet the prescribed eligibility requirements. Most employ-
ees are not statutorily entitled to either their employment or to their 
paychecks. Furthermore, an analogy to market employment relation-
ships also fails because under workfare, benefits received are not a 
function of the work performed. In a normal employer-employee re-
lationship, gross wages are directly related to the actual hours worked, 
the difficulty of the job, and the worker's level of skill, education, or 
experience. None of these factors affect a workfare participant's work 
obligation. "Gross wages" are nothing more than the statutorily calcu-
lated entitlement. The number of hours of work is determined by 
dividing the entitlement by a predetermined ''wage'' set below the 
average minimum wage.278 
The idea that workfare instills the "value of work" in welfare 
recipients is also misplaced.279 The value of work may indeed be about 
getting up every morning, trudging off to ajob, and then seeing one's 
efforts rewarded through a paycheck. Many hard-working Americans 
probably do not believe that their decision to work offers them any 
choic~ they work to pay the bills. They know that if they don't work, 
they won't eat, and welfare recipients should not have it any easier. 
The critical flaw in this analysis, however, is that the economic coercion 
that forces most Americans to work is radically different from the 
state-sponsored coercion that is at the heart of workfare. State-spon-
sored coercion is expressly prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. 
Indeed, the United States Constitution was designed to limit the power 
and control that government has over its citizens. Although economic 
coercion may be just as powerful a force as state-sponsored coercion, 
it was not anticipated by the framers of the Constitution to be as 
dangerous or as threatening to citizens as state-sponsored coercion. 
Furthermore, on a practical level, when hard-working Americans re-
fuse to work they often have marketable skills to sell elsewhere, savings 
to fall back on, unemployment benefits, and when all else fails--welfare. 
278 Statement of Mickey Kaus, supra note 253 (asserting that workfare jobs must pay below 
minimum wage because it would be unfair to give welfare recipients access to "better" jobs than 
employees in the marketplace). 
279Id. 
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The practical effect of the workfare system is to change the enti-
tlement nature of these benefits to that of a debt. In a mandatory 
workfare program, welfare recipients are not allowed something for 
nothing.280 If they receive a grant, then an obligation to work, or a debt, 
is created. This obligation is not significantly different from the debts 
that compelled employment under peonage.281 
Furthermore, workfare affects essentially the same population that 
peonage did: the poor. As with peonage, the group targeted suffers 
societal stigma. Peonage affected the children of former slaves and 
immigrants, and workfare affects single mothers.282 
Workfare also resembles peonage in that it creates a similar "wheel 
of servitude" found unconstitutional in United States v. Reynolds.283 
Under peonage, victims of the system had difficulty breaking away, 
because the debt under which they labored could be increased practi-
cally at the whim of their employers.284 Under workfare, as long as the 
welfare recipient continues to receive a relief grant, she must continue 
to work.285 Unfortunately, the opportunities that this work provides her 
are practically nonexistent.286 The work available to workfare recipients 
provides no marketable training and does not have a promotion track.287 
Consequently, like the peonage victim, she is effectively trapped in a 
system that compels her service. 
Although workfare programs do not impose criminal sanctions for 
noncompliance, the sanctions that are imposed can be just as coercive. 
Under the Clinton Plan, noncompliance will result in a dramatic re-
duction of benefits,288 and under the Republican Plan, states may com-
pletelyeliminate benefits for noncompliance.289 This reduction of benefits 
means that already destitute families will have no method of support. 
Although this form of coercion is more subtle than that endured by 
the the victims of peonage, it is no less real. As the peonage victims 
280 This "something for nothing" idea erroneously assumes that full-time child care is "noth-
ing." 
281 &e supra part II.B-C. 
282This analysis cannot overlook racial and ethnic factors. Nineteenth century peonage 
involved the black and immigrant labor force. Similarly, although modern welfare programs 
primarily service poor whites, society perceives that welfare recipients are black, latino, and Asian. 
283 235 U.S. 133, 146-47 (1914). 
284Id. at 147. 
285 &e Work and Responsibility Act, supra note 3, § 104 (termination of benefits shall not 
apply to individuals who continue working). 
286 See supra note 243. 
287Id. 
286 See Work and Responsibility Act, supra note 3, § 201 (discussing sanctions whereby already 
limited AFDC benefits would be reduced). 
289 Personal Responsibility Act, supra note 4, at § 202. 
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were forced to "choose" between the chain gang and servitude, welfare 
recipients must make a similar choice between servitude and the well-
being of their children. 
The similarities between peonage and workfare provide more than 
just an idle history lesson. The system of peonage that existed in the 
Reconstruction Era South was dismantled because it violated basic 
notions of personal liberty. 290 Peonage violated the Thirteenth Amend-
ment's prohibition against involuntary servitude.291 Based on these 
same principles, modern workfare programs also violate the Thir-
teenth Amendment. 
C. Exceptions to Involuntary Servitude Distinguished 
Labelling workfare as a duty of citizenship is probably the strong-
est argument against viewing workfare as involuntary servitude. In fact, 
the Clinton Plan characterizes the program in just those terms.292 The 
President has spoken widely about demanding that welfare recipients 
"give something back to their country."293 The idea is that if the invol-
untary servitude benefits the State, as opposed to a private individual, 
then it simply falls outside the definition. 294 
The language of the Thirteenth Amendment does not distinguish 
between public and private servitude.295 Excluding from the purview 
of the Thirteenth Amendment all compulsory servitude of a public 
nature, however, is absurdly broad because it effectively swallows the 
Amendment. Under this interpretation, actual slavery would be per-
missible as long as the State was the direct beneficiary. As the Supreme 
Court stated in Clyatt, regardless of how it was created or whatever its 
mode of origin, it is the character of the servitude that is centraJ.296 To 
argue that the citizenship exception applies to workfare would elevate 
form over substance. As with peonage, the basal fact of workfare is 
compulsory service based on indebtedness.297 
Furthermore, the citizenship exception is limited to the govern-
ment's responsibility to protect liberty.298 It is unclear what liberty 
290 See supra part II.B-C. 
291 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
292 See Work and Responsibility Act, supra note 3, § 101 (a); see also Kelly, supra note 8, at 
A20. 
293 Kelly, supra note 8, at A20. 
294Koppeiman, supra note 60, at 519. 
295 See supra part ILA. 
296 See 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905). 
297 See id. 
298 See supra part II.D. 
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interest is served by forcing welfare recipients to work for their wages. 
Tying workfare to duties of citizenship creates an effective media "sound-
bite," but it does not comport with constitutional analysis. 
The argument may also be asserted that a Thirteenth Amendment 
analysis is inapplicable to workfare proposals because requiring work 
from the poor has a long historical tradition.299 Practices that are 
strongly rooted in custom have been defined as an exception to the 
doctrine of involuntary servitude.30o As noted previously, however, this 
exception has been widely criticized.30l The institution of slavery itself 
was once a common practice with a long historical tradition. 302 Further-
more, this exception would render the Thirteenth Amendment static 
and ineffective; its application would be impermissibly limited and 
constrained. 
In Kozminski, the Supreme Court held that the term "involuntary 
servitude" means a condition of servitude in which the victim is forced 
to work by the use or threat of physical coercion or coercion through 
law or the legal process.303 A cursory review of this decision might 
suggest that workfare does not entail the type of physical or legal 
coercion required for a finding of involuntary servitude. Clearly, even 
the most virulent opponents of workfare do not insinuate that workfare 
conditions will include physical beatings, torture, or criminal penalties. 
Nonetheless, a more careful examination of Kozminski reveals that the 
decision actually supports the contention that workfare represents 
involuntary servitude.304 
This interpretation hinges on the meaning of legal coercion within 
the Court's definition of involuntary servitude. If "coercion through 
law or the legal process" was limited solely to the imposition or threats 
of criminal penalties, the Court would have so stated.305 Instead, the 
Court's language specifically leaves open a plethora of legally coercive 
activity that cannot be employed against the victims of involuntary 
servitude. Impermissible legal coercion could include threatened or 
actual deportation, commitment to a mental institution, as well as the 
299 See supra part III. 
300 See supra text accompanying notes 90-94. 
301 See supra note 91. 
302Id. 
303 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1987). 
304 See id. This conclusion is not based on the fact that the decision was a statutory, not 
constitutional, interpretation of involuntary servitude. Given that the Court's analysis was almost 
wholly rooted in its understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment, such a distinction amounts to 
mere legal formalism. See id. at 945. 
305 See id. at 952. 
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termination of welfare benefits. Indeed, all of these activities require 
certain formalities or legal process, and consequently, cannot be used 
under the Kozminski definition to compel labor. 
Assuming, in the alternative, that the meaning of legal coercion 
is in fact much narrower, the Kozminski decision still does not neces-
sarily undermine the argument that workfare is involuntary servitude. 
Even under a narrow construction of legal coercion, the opinion makes 
specific allowances for the special vulnerabilities or circumstances of 
the victim.306 The Court specifically infers that minors, immigrants, and 
the mentally incompetent suffer from such vulnerabilities.307 It is not 
unreasonable that poverty might also be the type of vulnerability envi-
sioned by the court. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Workfare is a program rooted in the belief that the poor are 
morally deviant and personally culpable for their poverty. From the 
Elizabethan poorhouse to the state experiments with workfare in the 
1980s, mandated work for relief has demonstrated a basic hostility to 
the poor. Proponents of workfare who contend that the program offers 
the poor greater dignity are fooling themselves. Forcing the poor into 
jobs they do not want, that offer no marketable skills, and that pay less 
than the minimum wage is not an effective way of bringing these 
people into the mainstream. People do not feel like they are equal 
citizens merely because they have a ')ob." There can be no equality if 
there exists one class of people who are free to choose their work, and 
another class of people who are forced into it. 
The United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Thir-
teenth Amendment in the Peonage Cases clearly holds that the right 
to one's own labor is inalienable. Free labor is a cornerstone in the 
foundation of United States constitutional law. This principle invali-
dated and effectively dismantled the system of peonage that prevailed 
in the Reconstruction Era South. Significantly, the factors and condi-
tions of the peonage system are strikingly similar to workfare. Although 
the brutality of peonage is absent from workfare, the compulsion of 
service is the same. Like peonage, state mandated workfare violates 
basic notions of personal liberty, and therefore, it too is invalid under 
the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution. 
306Id. 
307Id. at 952-53. 

